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ABSTRACT 
 
 
In recent years there has been a proliferation of international institutions, as well 
as renewed attention to the role that forum-shopping, nested and overlapping institutions, 
and regime complexes play in shaping the patterns of global governance.  A few 
policymakers, some international relations scholars, and many international law scholars 
posit that this trend will lead to a more rule-based world in world politics.  This paper 
takes a contrary position:  institutional proliferation has a paradoxical effect on global 
governance.  Proliferation shifts global governance structures from rule-based outcomes 
to power-based outcomes – because proliferation enhances the ability of the great powers 
to engage in forum-shopping.  This leads to another question – under what conditions 
will great power governments be constrained from forum-shopping?   Most of these 
factors suggested in the international regimes literature do not pose either a consistent or 
persistent constraint to forum-shopping.  The paper then examines a case that represents a 
“tough test” for the proposed argument:  the 2001 Doha Declaration on intellectual 
property rights and public health, and its aftermath.  This is a case where forum-shopping 
was temporarily constrained.  I argue that issue linkage and organizational reputation can 
temporarily increase the viscosity of global governance.  The barriers to forum-shopping 
are not constant over time, however; in the long run, there is little viscosity in global 
governance structures. 
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In recent years there has been a proliferation of international institutions, as well 
as renewed attention to the role that forum-shopping, nested and overlapping institutions, 
and regime complexes play in shaping the patterns of global governance.1  A few 
policymakers, a fair number of international relations scholars, and many international 
lawyers posit that this trend will lead to a more rule-based world in world politics.  This 
increased attention has not necessarily improved our theoretical understanding of the 
phenomenon, however.  The increasing thickness of the global institutional environment 
clearly suggests a change in the fabric of world politics.  Just as clearly, however, great 
powers have demonstrated a willingness to substitute different decision-making fora in 
order to advance their interests in world politics.  This leads to an important question.  
Does the proliferation of rules, laws, norms and organizational forms lead to an increase 
in rule-based outcomes, or merely an increase in forum-shopping?     
IR theorists have tried to move beyond demonstrating the mere existence of 
institutional choice and forum-shopping to explaining when it is likely to occur.  What 
are the necessary and sufficient conditions that would lead a great power to substitute 
governance structure within a regime complex?  To get at this question, this paper makes 
two arguments about the effect of institutional thickening on global governance 
outcomes.  First, the proliferation of rules, laws and institutional forms has a paradoxical 
and parabolic effect on global governance.  As global governance structures morph from 
international regimes to regime complexes, legal and organizational proliferation 
eventually shifts world politics from rule-based outcomes to power-based outcomes – 
because proliferation enhances the ability of powerful states to engage in forum-
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shopping.  Small states as well as the great powers can avail themselves of this strategy.  
There are a variety of reasons, however, why this tactic favors the strong over the weak to 
a greater degree than if forum-shopping did not occur at all.   
The second part of the paper considers whether there are exceptions to this 
general prediction.  Under what conditions will great power governments be constrained 
from forum-shopping?   The concept of viscosity might be useful here.  In fluid 
mechanics, viscosity is the resistance a material has to change in its form.  High levels of 
viscosity imply a material that is slow to change.  In global governance, high levels of 
viscosity would mean lots of internal frictions within a single regime complex, making it 
costly to shift fora.  It is worth contemplating whether some regime complexes suffer 
from higher rates of viscosity than others – and also whether some regime complexes 
grow more or less viscous over time.   When are the costs associated with switching fora 
too prohibitive?   
Recent literature on international organizations, including the Rational Design 
school, propose a number of factors that could explain the relative viscosity of global 
governance structures.2  These include membership, scope, centralization, legalization, 
legitimacy, and reputation.  The paper suggests that most of these factors do not pose 
either a consistent or persistent constraint to forum-shopping.  After examining one 
example of where forum-shopping was temporarily constrained – the 2001 Doha 
Declaration on intellectual property rights and public health – this paper suggests that 
issue linkage and organizational reputation can temporarily increase the viscosity of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1 Raustiala and Victor 2004; Aggarwal 2005; Alter and Meunier 2006.  
2 Koremnos, Lipson and Snidal 2003.     
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global governance.  The barriers to forum-shopping are not constant over time, however; 
in the long run, there is little viscosity in global governance structures. 
The rest of this paper is divided into six sections.  The next section revisits the 
realist-institutionalist debate to understand why institutions might contribute to more 
rule-based outcomes in the first place.  The third section discusses why the proliferation 
and legalization of global governance structures can undercut rather than reinforce 
institutionalist theories of world politics.  The following section draws on recent literature 
to evaluate the collection of factors that could increase the viscosity of global 
governance.  The fifth section examines the Doha Declaration to determine what factors 
prevented short-term forum-shopping on intellectual property rights.  The final section 
summarizes and concludes.   
 
 
Why institutions matter  
 
To understand how increasing institutional proliferation can affect global 
governance outcomes, it is worth reflecting why international institutions are considered 
to be important in the first place.  In the debate that took place between realists and 
institutionalists a generation ago, the latter group of theorists articulated in great detail 
how international regimes and institutions mattered in world politics.  The institutionalist 
logic is persuasive in a world with coherent and cohesive international regimes.  In an 
environment of institutional proliferation, however, many of the proffered reasons for 
why institutions matter begin to lose their explanatory power.   
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The primary goal of neoliberal institutionalism was to demonstrate that even in an 
anarchic world populated by states with unequal amounts of power, structured 
cooperation was still possible.3  According to this approach, international institutions are 
a key mechanism through which cooperation becomes possible.  A key causal process 
through which institutions facilitate cooperation is by developing arrangements that act as 
“focal points” for states in the international system.4  Much as the new institutionalist 
literature in American politics focused on the role that institutions played in facilitating a 
“structure induced equilibrium” within domestic politics, neoliberal institutionalists made 
a similar argument about international regimes and world politics.5  By creating a 
common set of rules or norms for all participants, institutions help to intrinsically define 
cooperation, while highlighting instances when states defect from the agreed-upon rules.   
The importance of institutions as focal points for actors in world politics is a 
recurring theme within the institutionalist literature.  Indeed, this concept is embedded 
with Stephen Krasner’s commonly accepted definition for international regimes:  
“implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around 
which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.”6  More 
than a decade later, Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin reaffirmed that, “in complex 
situations involving many states, international institutions can step in to provide 
‘constructed focal points’ that make particular cooperative outcomes prominent.”7 
                                                          
3 Keohane 1984; Oye 1986; Baldwin 1993; Keohane and Martin 1995; Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger 
1996; Martin and Simmons 1998.  Though often conflated, the institutionalist paradigm is distinct from 
liberal theories of international politics.  On this distinction, see Moravcsik 1997.   
4 Schelling 1960. 
5 On structure-induced equilibrium, see Shepsle and Weingast 1981.  See Milner 1997, and Martin and 
Simmons 1998, for conscious discussions of translating this concept to the anarchic realm of world politics.    
6 Krasner 1983, p. 2.  See also North 1991, p. 97 
7 Keohane and Martin 1995, p. 45.   
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By creating focal points and reducing the transaction costs of rule creation, 
institutions can shift arenas of international relations from power-based outcomes to rule-
based outcomes.  In the former, disputes are resolved without any articulated or agreed-
upon set of decision-making criteria.  The result is a Hobbesian order commonly 
associated with the realist paradigm.8  While such a system does not automatically imply 
that force or coercion will be used by stronger states to secure their interests, the shadow 
of such coercion is ever-present in the calculations of weaker actors.9   
Most institutionalists agree that power also plays a role in rule-based outcomes as 
well.10  However, they would also posit that the creation of a well-defined international 
regime imposes constraints on the behavior of actors that are not present in a strictly 
Hobbesian system.  Institutions act as binding mechanisms that permit displays of 
credible commitment.  In pledging to abide by clearly-defined rules, great powers make it 
easier for others to detect noncooperative behavior.  These states will incur reputation 
costs if they choose to defect.  If the regime is codified, then they impose additional legal 
obligations to comply that augment the reputation costs of defection.11   
Institutionalists – and even some realists – further argue that once international 
regimes are created, they will persist even after the original distributions of power and 
interest have shifted.12  Because the initial creation of institutions can be costly, 
Hasenclever et al point out, “the expected utility of maintaining the present, suboptimal 
(albeit still beneficial) regime is greater than the utility of letting it die, returning to 
                                                          
8 Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 1994/95, 2001.   
9 Carr 1939 [1964]; Drezner 2003. 
10 Indeed, Oran Young made this point in an early article about international regimes.  See Young (1980), 
p. 338.   
11 Abbott and Snidal 2001; Goldstein and Martin 2000.   
12 Ikenberry 2000.   
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unfettered self-help behavior, and then trying to build a more satisfactory regime.”13  
Some realist scholars have acknowledged that international regimes will persist despite 
changes in the underlying distribution of power.14  For smaller and weaker actors, 
institutions provide an imperfect shield against the vicissitudes of a purely Hobbesian 
order.15   
It does not take a great deal of effort to find examples in both security and IPE of 
hegemonic compliance with international regimes even when such a move goes against 
their short-term interests.  Despite its reputation for unilateralism, the Bush 
administration complied with a WTO dispute settlement body’s ruling that its imposition 
of steel tariffs in 2002 contravened world trade law.  The administration removed the 
tariffs in late 2003 despite the political hit President Bush would incur in his re-election 
campaign.16  As Judith Goldstein and Lisa Martin point out, “the use of legal rule 
interpretation [in the WTO] has made it increasingly difficult for governments to get 
around obligations by invoking escape clauses and safeguards.”17   
In the security realm, Richard Holbrooke recounted one key motivation for 
President Clinton to intervene in Bosnia in 1995 – a NATO obligation under OpPlan 40-
104 to commit U.S. troops to evacuate British and French peacekeepers.  As Holbrooke 
recounts:18   
[OpPlan 40-104] had already been formally approved by the NATO 
Council as a planning document, thus significantly reducing Washington’s 
options….  
 
                                                          
13 Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger 1996, p. 187.   
14 Krasner 1983, pp. 357-361.   
15 Reus-Smit 2004. 
16 On the domestic politics of the steel tariffs, see Susskind 2004.   
17 Goldstein and Martin 2000, p. 619.   
18 Holbrooke 1998, p. 66-67. 
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The President would still have to make the final decision to deploy U.S. 
troops, but his options had been drastically narrowed.  If, in the event of a 
U.N. withdrawal, he did not deploy American troops, the United States 
would be flouting, in its first test, the very NATO process it had created.  
The resulting recriminations could mean the end of NATO as an effective 
military alliance, as the British and French had already said to us privately.   
  
 By the late nineties, most variety of realists allowed that the international 
institutions could contribute to rule-based outcomes.19  Other realists have acknowledged 
the contributions made by neoliberal institutionalists.  As Randall Schweller and Davis 
Priess observed, “institutions matter because even the most rudimentary actions among 
states requires agreement on, and some shared understanding of, the basic rules of the 
game.20  In moving from an anarchical world structure to one with coherent international 
regimes, institutions could contribute to a shift away from Hobbesian outcomes in world 
politics.   
 
The tangled web of global governance 
 
For the first generation of institutionalist literature, the key problem was how to 
surmount the transaction costs necessary to agree upon the rules of the game in a world 
where there were no institutional focal points.21  The proliferation of international law 
and international organizations reduces the importance of this question, however.22  Table 
1 demonstrates the proliferation of global governance structures in recent years.  There 
                                                          
19 The obvious exception here are structural neorealists and offensive realists.  See Waltz 1979 and 
Mearsheimer 1994/95.   
20 Schweller and Priess 1997, p. 10.   
21 For a review, see Lipson 2004, 1-4.   
22 For an empirical account of this growth see Shanks, Jacobson, and Kaplan 1996.   
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has clearly been a steady increase in the number of conventional IGOs, autonomous 
conferences, and multilateral treaties.   
The causes for this increase are clearly varied, ranging from rational to mimetic 
causes.  Robert Keohane argues that increased “issue density” stimulates the demand for 
new rules, laws and institutions.23  In other instances, the “capture” of international 
institutional institutions by a powerful state or interest group could spur the creation of 
countervailing organizational forms.24  The creation of new regimes – and the 
manipulation of old ones – can help rational actors cope with situations of uncertainty 
and complexity.25     Some scholars go further, suggesting that the bounded rationality of 
international actors explains the existence of such structures.  Organizational overlap is 
created when institutions are created in an evolutionary manner, suggesting that such 
instances are not planned in advance.26  The world society school posits that actors create 
new rules and institutions as a mimetic exercise to adopt the forms of powerful 
institutions.27 
In a world thick with institutions, the problem for institutionalists is no longer 
surmounting the transaction costs of policy coordination, but selecting among a welter of 
possible governance arrangements.28  As Duncan Snidal and Joseph Jupille point out:  
“Institutional choice is now more than just a starting point for analysts and becomes the 
dependent variable to be explained in the context of alternative options.”29   
                                                          
23 Keohane 1982.   
24 On this possibility, see Mansfield 1995.   
25 Koremenos 2005; Rosendorff and Milner 2001.   
26 Jupille and Snidal 2005; Snidal and Viola 2006.   
27 Meyer et al, ????.   
28 Krasner 1991; Drezner 2007a.   
29 Jupille and Snidal 2005, p. 2.     
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The current generation of institutionalist work recognizes the existence of 
multiple and overlapping institutional orders.30  For many issues and/or regions, more 
than one international organization can claim competency.  Kal Raustiala and David 
Victor label this phenomenon as regime complexes:   “an array of partially overlapping 
and nonhierarchical institutions governing a particular issue-area.  Regime complexes are 
marked by the existence of several legal agreements that are created and maintained in 
distinct fora with participation of different sets of actors.”31  Even those who stress the 
non-rational aspects of global governance agree that some actors engage in explicit 
efforts to foster strategic inconsistencies within a single regime complex.32   
Many scholars and practitioners have welcomed the proliferation of international 
institutions.  The literature on regime complexes and the progressive legalization of 
world politics examines the extent to which these legal overlaps constitute a new source 
of specific politics and what strategies governments pursue to maneuver in such an 
institutional environment.33  Policymakers issue calls for ever-increasing institutional 
thickness.34  In the final report of the Princeton Project on National Security, John 
Ikenberry and Anne-Marie Slaughter concluded:   
[H]arnessing cooperation in the 21st century will require many new kinds 
of institutions, many of them network-based, to provide speed, flexibility, 
and context-based decision making tailored to specific problems. This 
combination of institutions, and the habits and practices of cooperation 
that they would generate – even amid ample day-to-day tensions and 
diplomatic conflict – would represent the infrastructure of an overall 
international order that provides the stability and governance capacity 
necessary to address global problems.35 
                                                          
30 Aggarwal 1998, 2005; Helfer 1999, 2004; Raustala and Victor 2004; Jupille and Snidal 2005; Alter and 
Meunier 2006.   
31 Raustiala and Victor, 2004, p. 279.   
32 Raustiala and Victor 2004, p. 298.     
33 See the citations in fn. 1.   
34 For a recent example, see Daalder and Lindsey 2007.   
35 Ikenberry and Slaughter 2006, p. 27.  See also Slaughter 1997, 2004.   
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As regimes grow into regime complexes, however, there are at least four reasons 
to believe that the institutionalist logic for how regimes generate rule-based orders will 
fade.  First, the proliferation of regime complexes and decision-making fora leads to an 
inevitable increase in the number of possible focal points around which rules and 
expectations can converge.36  The problem, of course, is that by definition focal points 
should be rare.  If the number of constructed focal points increases, then actors in world 
politics face a larger menu of possible rule sets to negotiate.  Logically, actors will seek 
out the fora where they would expect the most favorable outcome.37   
All actors will pursue this strategy, but institutional thickness endows great 
powers with an advantage.  Because powerful states possess greater capabilities for 
institutional creation and sanctioning, regime complexes endow them with additional 
agenda-setting and enforcement powers relative to a single regime.38  For example, 
Emilie Hafner-Burton looks at the relative performance of different components of the 
human rights regime complex.39  She finds statistical evidence that human rights 
provisions contained within American and European preferential trade agreements have a 
more significant effect on human rights performance than the effect of United Nations 
human rights treaties.  In this situation, the ability of the United States and European 
Union to shift fora away from the United Nations and into trade deals allowed these 
governments to push for their preferred human rights standards.  Even though their 
                                                          
36 This is true even if newer organizational forms are created to buttress existing regimes.  Actors that 
create new rules, laws and organizations will consciously or unconsciously adapt these regimes to their 
political, legal, and cultural particularities.  Even if the original intent is to reinforce existing regimes, 
institutional mutations will take place that can be exploited via forum-shopping as domestic regimes and 
interests change over time.  For empirical examples, see Raustiala 1997; Hafner-Burton, n.d.   
37 Raustiala and Victor 1994, p. 280; Drezner 2007, chapter three.   
38 Krasner 1991.   
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overall intent was similar, the specific rights pushed by the US and EU differed for 
domestic reasons.40   
Second, the proliferation of international rules, laws, and regimes make it more 
difficult to determine when an actor has actually defected from a pre-existing regime.  
Within a single international regime, the focal point should be clear enough for 
participating actors to recognize when a state is deviating from the agreed-upon rules.  If 
there are multiple, conflicting regimes that govern a particular issue area, then actors will 
argue that they are complying with the regime that favors their interests the most, even if 
they are defecting from other regimes.  Consider, for example, the ongoing trade dispute 
between the United States and European Union over genetically modified organisms in 
food.41  The US insists that the issue falls under the WTO’s purview – because the WTO 
has embraced rules that require the EU to demonstrate scientific proof that GMOs are 
unsafe.  The EU insists that the issue falls under the 2001 Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety  -- because that protocol embraces the precautionary principle of regulation.  
The result is a legal deadlock, with the biosafety protocol’s precautionary principle 
infringing upon the trade regime’s norm of scientific proof of harm.  Legal and 
development experts agree that it will be difficult to reconcile the WTO and Cartagena 
regimes.42     
Third, the legalization of world politics can paradoxically reduce the sense of 
legal obligation that improves actor compliance with international regimes.  As Raustiala 
and Victor point out, “the international legal system has no formal hierarchy of treaty 
                                                                                                                                                                             
39 Hafner-Burton 2005.   
40 Hafner-Burton n.d. 
41 Drezner 2007a, chapter six. 
42 Thomas et al 2000; Millstone and van Zwanenberg 2003.   
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rules.  nor does it possess well-established mechanisms or principles for resolving the 
most difficult conflicts across the various elemental regimes.”43  Because of legal 
equivalence, states can evade international laws and treaties that conflict with their 
current interests by seeking out regimes with different laws.   
This problem is hardly unique to international law.  In American politics, for 
example, different federal agencies with different mandates will often conflict at the 
joints of a complex policy problem.  This leads to obvious legal or bureaucratic battles.  
There is at least one important differences between the domestic and international realm, 
however.  In American politics, administrative law and administrative courts function as 
a means for adjudicating overlapping mandates.  No concomitant body of widely-
recognized law exists at the international level.   
Legally, competing legal claims create a stalemate.  States, international 
governmental organizations, and courts will face complexity in trying to implement 
policies that lie at the joints of regime complexes.44  Politically, however, this situation 
privileges more powerful actors at the expense of weaker ones.  When states can bring 
conflicting legal precedents to a negotiation, the actor with greater enforcement 
capabilities will have the bargaining advantage.  The reason the US and EU benefit so 
much from the World Trade Organization is not just that they can sanction countries that 
violate WTO rules – but that other countries have limited sanctioning power in dealing 
with their legal infractions.  For example, after Antigua and Barbuda successfully won a 
WTO ruling contravening the U.S. ban on offshore Internet gambling, the Caribbean 
                                                          
43 Raustiala and Victor 2004, p. 300.  The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides a limited set 
of norms regarding the hierarchy of law, but observed adherence to these norms remains unclear.   
44 Aggarwal 2005; Alter and Meunier 2006. 
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microstate found itself hard-pressed to successfully enforce the decision.  Its sanctioning 
powers over the United States are limited.45 
Finally, and related to the last point, institutional proliferation increases the 
complexity of legal and technical rules.  In such a complex institutional environment, 
more powerful actors have the upper hand.  Negotiating the myriad global governance 
structures and treaties requires considerable amounts of legal training and technical 
expertise related to the issue area at hand.  Although these transaction costs might seem 
trivial to great powers with large bureaucracies, they can be imposing for smaller states.46  
This is particularly true when dealing with regime complexes that contain potentially 
inconsistent elements.  Navigating competing global governance structures requires a 
great deal of specialized human capital.  This is a relatively scarce resource in much of 
the developing world, ad less problematic for states that command significant resources.47 
Figure 1 displays the relationship posited here between institutional thickness and 
the prevalence of rule-based outcomes.  In moving from a purely Hobbesian order to one 
with a single, well-defined international regime, there is a marked shift away from 
power-based outcomes to rule-based outcomes.  However, as institutional thickness 
increases, the prevalence of power-based outcomes increases.  Contrary to the 
expectations of global governance scholars and practitioners, after a certain point the 
proliferation of nested and overlapping regimes and the legalization of world politics 
actually contributes to more power-based outcomes.   
                                                          
45 For a brief review of this case, see Henry Lanman, “Rollng the Dice,” Slate, November 16, 2006.  
Accessed at http://www.slate.com/id/2153352/.   
46 Stiglitz 2002, p. 227; Jordan and Majnoni 2002; Reinhardt 2003; Drezner 2007a, chapter five.   
47 Some governments outsource their legal needs to western law firms well-versed in international law.  
This mitigates the human capital problem, but replaces it with a budgetary problem.    
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A world of institutional proliferation turns the realist-institutionalist debate on its 
head.  If it is possible for the major powers to shift policy from one fora to another, an 
institutionally thick world begins to resemble the neorealist depiction of anarchy.  A 
hegemon like the United States has the luxury of selecting the fora that maximizes 
decision-making legitimacy while ensuring the preferred outcome.  For example, in the 
wake of the financial crises of the nineties, the G-7 countries shifted decision-making 
from the friendly confines of the IMF to the even friendlier confines of the Financial 
Stability Forum.48  If there are only minimal costs to forum-shopping, and if different 
IGOs promulgate legally equivalent outputs, then institutional thickness, combined with 
low levels of viscosity, actually increases the likelihood of neorealist policy outcomes.   
Policymakers and policy analysts in the United States have become increasingly 
aware of the ability to exploit institutional proliferation to advance American interests.  
Richard Haass, Director of Policy Planning in the State Department from 2001 to 2003, 
articulated the Bush administration’s approach to global governance as “a la carte 
multilateralism.” According to this doctrine, the United States would choose to adhere to 
some but not all international agreements, to ensuring that favored multilateral 
arrangements would expanded rather than constrain U.S. options.49  Francis Fukuyama 
explicitly endorses a forum-shopping strategy in promoting the idea of “multi-
multilateralism”:50   
An appropriate agenda for American foreign policy will be to promote a 
world populated by a large number of overlapping and sometimes 
competitive international institutions, what can be labeled multi-
                                                          
48 Drezner 2007a, chapter five. 
49 Thom Shanker, “White House Says the U.S. Is Not a Loner, Just Choosy,” New York Times, July 31, 
2001, p. A1; Richard Haass, “Multilateralism for a Global Era,” remarks to Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace/Center on International Cooperation Conference, Washington, DC, November 14. 
Available at http://www.state.gov/s/p/rem/6134.htm (accessed October 19, 2006).   
50 Fukyuama 2006, p. 158, 168. 
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multilateralism.  In this world the United Nations will not disappear, but it 
would become one of several organizations that fostered legitimate and 
effective international action. 
 
…. a multiplicity of geographically and functionally overlapping 
institutions will permit the United States and other powers to “forum 
shop” for an appropriate instrument to facilitate international 
cooperation.” 
  
This leads to the next question:  what factors increase the costs of forum-
shopping?  What makes regime complexes viscous? 
 
 
Candidate constraints to forum-shopping 
 
Recent work on international organizations – including the Rational Design 
project and legalization efforts in the pages of International Organization – suggest a 
welter of possible independent variables to explain the variation in coordination 
solutions:  membership, scope, centralization, legalization, and legitimacy, among others. 
While these variables undeniably affect the origins of international regimes, the 
shift in focus from forum-creation to forum-shifting renders many of these factors less 
important. The variables of concern in the study of regime creation seem less salient in 
looking at institutional choice.  Any examination of the cohesion of international choice 
must recognize that at some point in the past, the relevant actors were able to agree on a 
set of strategies such that cooperation was the equilibrium outcome.51  This means that 
the costs of monitoring and enforcement could not have been too great.  As James Fearon 
                                                          
51 See Keohane 1984 for a verbal description of cooperation, and Bendor and Swistak 1997, pp. 297-298 
for a more technical description.     
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observes:  “[T]here is a potentially important selection effect behind cases of international 
negotiations aimed at cooperation.  We should observe serious attempts at international 
cooperation in cases where the monitoring and enforcement dilemmas are probably 
resolvable (author’s italics).”52    
This selection effect implies that some factors affecting the origins of 
international cooperation are not as relevant for explaining the persistence of 
international regimes.  For example, cooperation theorists place a great deal of emphasis 
on the ability of international regimes to centralize the provision of information to ensure 
effective monitoring of norm adherence.53  While it cannot be questioned that imperfect 
information about actions can lead to the breakdown of cooperation, it would be odd to 
claim that states invest in negotiations to reach an agreement without considering how to 
monitor it.54  It would be hard to believe that information provision would provide a 
barrier to forum-shopping.   
Legal complexity and ambiguity could potentially explain why governments are 
blocked from forum-shopping, regardless of the issue area.  Karen Alter and Sophie 
Meunier argue, for example, that the relationship between EU law and WTO law was 
ambiguous.  Because of the hard legalization of both regimes, resolution of the banana 
dispute was more difficult than in a world of costless forum-shopping.55      
The problem with this argument is that the degree of legal complexity inherent in 
nested and overlapping institutions is often overestimated.  For example, both Vinod 
Aggarwal and Alter & Meunier posit that because international law remains non-
                                                          
52 Fearon 1998, p. 279.     
53 Axelrod and Keohane 1985; Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal 2001; Mitchell 1998; Dai 2002.   
54 Downs, Rocke and Barsoom 1996.   
55 Alter and Meunier, 2006, p. 377. 
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hierarchical, it is difficult for one legal agreement to “trump” another.  This fact, 
however, gives great powers an incentive to create new institutions as a way to hedge 
against unfavorable outcomes in pre-existing institutions.  Even when there are 
differences between hard law and soft law institutions, great powers can manipulate fora 
on either the rule creation or rule enforcement dimension.56  Through forum-shopping, 
great powers can dilute or evade even the hardest legal strictures, with non-legal factors 
playing the pivotal role in determining governance outcomes.   
For example, the anti-money laundering regime consists of multiple governance 
bodies with different degrees of legal standing.57  The primary international standard – 
the Financial Action Task Force forty recommendations on money laundering – has 
achieved widespread compliance.  FATF itself is not a treaty-based organization, 
however, nor is it an emanation of one.58  Neither is the Financial Stability Forum, the 
body that recommended the promulgation of the FATF standard.  The low level of 
legalization of both the FSF and FATF was not a hindrance to forum-shifting away from 
the international financial institutions – indeed, if anything, their membership structure 
and relative informality were an attractor for the United States and the European Union.  
In the end, the great powers were able to have the FSF’s recommendations implemented 
and monitored by the IMF.  John Eatwell characterized the outcome accurately:  “the 
IMF is using a treaty-sanctioned surveillance function to examine adherence to codes and 
principles that are not themselves developed by accountable treaty bodies.”59  Despite the 
                                                          
56 Manipulating fora during the adjudication phase (if there is one) is a more difficult, though not 
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high degree of legalization within the IMF, the G-7 countries were able to shift law 
creation to less formal international bodies.   
The hard law/soft law distinction might be useful in discerning between which 
parts of a functional regime complex are used for rule creation and which parts are used 
for monitoring and enforcement.  However, legalization in and of itself is not a barrier for 
shifting rule creation to another forum – indeed, hard legalization might promote the 
proliferation of rule creation in order to dilute the impact of some hard law regimes.60    
Membership can also posited as a barrier to forum-shopping through its effects on 
collective legitimacy.  An IGO has high legitimacy if it can enhance the normative desire 
to comply with the promulgated rules and regulations.  Norms derive their power in part 
from the number of actors that formally accept them.61  The greater the number of actors 
that accept a rule or regulation, the greater the social pressure on recalcitrant actors to 
change their position.62  As an IGO’s membership increases, its perceived “democratic” 
mandate concomitantly increases – thereby enhancing its legitimating power. On this 
dimension, the more powerful compliance-inducing IGOs are those with the widest 
membership – such as the United Nations organizations.63  Aspiring forum-shoppers must 
factor in the costs of lost legitimacy if they try to shift governance responsibilities away 
from legitimate institutions.    
The problem with this logic is that it ignores the existence of alternative sources 
of collective legitimacy.  Membership affects process legitimacy, under the assumption 
that an IGO with more participants confers greater authority. Beyond membership, 
                                                          
60 Goldstein and Martin 2000.   
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however, IGOs can derive process legitimacy from other factors, such as technical 
expertise, a track record of prior success, or simply the aggregate power of member 
governments.  In some cases, the democratic character of the member states in question 
affects legitimacy.64  For example, the U.S. opted to launch its 1999 bombing campaign 
against Serbia with the backing of NATO rather than the United Nations Security 
Council.  This action generated minimal costs in terms legitimacy.   One could argue that 
was for two reasons.  First, in terms of military power, expertise, and past success, NATO 
had greater legitimacy than the United Nations, despite the latter IGO’s advantage in 
membership.  Second, Serbia’s reputation as a transgressive actor during the Balkan Wars 
gave NATO a greater moral legitimacy.65   
Theoretical factors that affect the design and effectiveness of regime complexes 
do not significantly affect their viscosity. Indeed, in looking at a range of empirical cases 
from the global political economy, there appear to be few barriers to forum-shifting when 
the great powers want to change the content or enforcement of the rules.66  There are 
exceptions, however.  The next section looks in greater detail at one example of high 
viscosity to see what lessons, if any, can be generalized from it.    
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
63 Steffek 2003.  It is certainly debatable whether the one-country, one vote principle used in most IGOs is 
truly democratic – however, the question here is whether the perception of democracy is present. 
64 Pevehouse 2002.   
65 NATO’s success in halting Serbian actions in Kosovo highlights another point – regardless of process 
legitimacy, there is also the legitimacy of outcomes.  If great powers deviate from established international 
regimes, but succeed in achieving their stated goals, that success can ex post legitimate their actions.  For 
example, despite the UN Security Council’s refusal to authorize Operation Iraqi Freedom, Security Council 
Resolution 1483, passed in May 2003, conferred legitimacy by recognizing Great Britain and the United 
States as the “Authority” in Iraq.  See http://www.casi.org.uk/info/undocs/scres/2003/res1483.pdf (accessed 
November 2006).   
66 Drezner 2007a.   
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The case of the Doha Declaration 
 
The intellectual property rights (IPR) regime complex for pharmaceuticals 
represents a tough test for the arguments made in this paper.  The World Trade 
Organization is the center of gravity for the IPR regime complex, and has the reputation 
of being a high-functioning organization.  Its Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) 
represents the gold standard of international judicial power.  Furthermore, as will be seen, 
the humanitarian norms invoked on the issue of pharmaceutical patents are singularly 
powerful.  Once enshrined, global civil society scholars posited that it would be 
extremely difficult for even powerful states to evade their normative power.67  If any 
regime should have displayed persistently high levels of viscosity, it should have been 
this one.     
In November 2001, at the Doha Ministerial meeting of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), member governments responded to concerns that the trade-related 
intellectual property rights regime (TRIPS) was too stringent in the protection of patented 
pharmaceuticals.  Members signed off on the “Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health” or Doha declaration.  This declaration stated that:   
 
[T]he TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent members from 
taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating 
our commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement 
can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of 
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WTO members' right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote 
access to medicines for all.68 
 
In August 2003, an additional WTO agreement was reached to clarify remaining 
ambiguities from the Doha declaration.69  In December 2005 these agreements were 
codified through a permanent amendment to the TRIPS accord.70  These events were the 
culmination of a sustained campaign by global civil society designed to scale back 
intellectual property restrictions on the production and distribution of generic drugs to the 
developing world.71   
Neither the United States nor the European Union wanted the Doha Declaration 
The American negotiating position was that the original TRIPS accord already contained 
public health exceptions for epidemics and the like.72  Furthermore, the U.S. wanted any 
exception to be limited to poor countries with weak state institutions that suffer from 
epidemics – but that the carve-out should not go any further.  Whereas the final 
declaration actually said that the TRIPS accord, “does not and should not prevent 
members from taking measures to protect public health,” the U.S. preferred narrower 
language, asserting a right “to take measures necessary to address these public health 
crises, in particular to secure affordable access to medicines.”73  The European 
                                                          
68 “Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,” 
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70 “Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement,” 6 December 2005. Accessed at 
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71 Epstein and Chen 2002; Sell 2003; Prakash and Sell 2004;  
72 Office of the USTR, “TRIPs and Health Emergencies,” 10 November 2001.  Accessed at 
http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2001/November/TRIPs_Health_Emergencies.html, 
10 August 2005.  See, in particular, articles 7, 8, 30, and 31 of the original TRIPS agreement.    
73 Elizabeth Olson, “Drug Issue Casts a Shadow on Trade Talks,” New York Times, 2 November 2001.   
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Commission’s position on the TRIPS accord was similar.74  Global civil society 
advocates and developing countries, in contrast, wanted as broad a “public health” 
exception to TRIPS as possible, covering any and all forms of illness – and got what they 
wanted in the Doha Declaration.   
The distribution of preferences on this issue is a classic example of club standards 
– a coterie of powerful states possessed radically different preferences from the rest of the 
world.75  If the transaction costs of forum-shopping were minimal, one would predict the 
great powers to create new institutions guaranteeing that their regulatory preferences 
were locked in.  In the past and present both the United States and the European Union 
have run into roadblocks at universal-membership IGOs.  At these junctures in the past, 
great powers have evinced the willingness and the ability to either act unilaterally or shift 
fora to friendlier IGOs.76  This would have been especially true of the Bush 
administration in late 2001, given their revealed preference towards multilateral 
diplomacy.  The important counterfactual question worth asking is why the great powers 
agreed to the Doha Declaration when there were alternative strategies outside the WTO 
process.   
The answer appears to be that the costs of forum-shopping were uniquely 
prohibitive for the great powers at the time of the Doha ministerial.  In the aftermath of 
the September 11th attacks, the United States was determined to launch a trade round at 
Doha for two reasons.  First, the United States wanted to counter impressions that the 
terrorist attacks would weaken the process of economic globalization and/or undercut 
                                                          
74 European Commission, “Agreement on Intellectual Property Rights Relating to Trade and 
Pharmaceutical Patents,” accessed at http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l21168.htm, 11 August 2005.   
75 Drezner 2007a, chapter three.   
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U.S. leadership.77  Second, the great powers wanted a successful trade round in order to 
reinvigorate a global economy slumping from the aftereffects of the terrorist attacks and 
the concomitant slowdown in global trade.78   
U.S. and European leaders were quite conscious of the link between a successful 
round and the terrorist attacks.  Nine days after the attacks, Federal Reserve Chairman 
Alan Greenspan testified before the Senate that, “A successful [trade] round would not 
only significantly enhance world economic growth but also answer terrorism with a firm 
reaffirmation of our commitment to open and free societies.”79  U.S. Trade 
Representative Robert Zoellick echoed these remarks in a Washington Post op-ed the 
very same day, stating, “We need to infuse our global leadership with a new sense of 
purpose and lasting resolve…. the Bush administration has an opportunity to shape 
history by raising the flag of American economic leadership. The terrorists deliberately 
chose the World Trade towers as their target. While their blow toppled the towers, it 
cannot and will not shake the foundation of world trade and freedom.”80  As the 
ministerial started in Doha, the British Trade and Industry Secretary warned that the “war 
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Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 20 September 2001.  Accessed at 
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on terrorism could be lost here.”81  Hyperbole aside, media coverage of the run-up to 
Doha also stressed the importance of a successful ministerial meeting to buttress 
perceptions of U.S. leadership.82 
The failure to launch a trade round at Seattle three years earlier also increased the 
stakes at Doha for the ability of the WTO regime to advance trade liberalization.  As 
Zoellick pointed out in October 2001, “the WTO stumbled badly in its first effort, in 
Seattle in 1999, to launch a round of global trade liberalization. It has not been keeping 
up with the challenges of a changing world economy. The meeting in Doha needs to get 
the WTO back on track.”83  Even prior to the September 11th attacks, WTO Director-
General Mike Moore stressed the importance of a successful ministerial meeting at Doha 
given what transpired at Seattle:  “failure to reach consensus on a forward work 
programme that would advance the objectives of the multilateral trading system, 
particularly in the light of the earlier failure at Seattle, would lead many to question the 
value of the WTO as a forum for negotiation. It would certainly condemn us to a long 
period of irrelevance.”84  Following the Doha meeting, Zoellick declared, “We have 
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removed the stain of Seattle.”85  Contemporaneous media accounts confirm the shadow 
that Seattle cast over American and European trade negotiators in the run-up to Doha.86 
Finally, the ability of the great powers to shift fora on intellectual property from 
WIPO to the WTO in the Uruguay round made it that much more difficult to try and shift 
governance structures again less than a decade later.  Ironically, the efforts to create 
enforceable “hard law” on IPR in the first place also raised the costs on future forum-
shifting.87  Because the Americans and Europeans had invested so much in the WTO, any 
legal weakening of the TRIPS regime would be costly to them for other aspects of WTO 
enforcement, such as the dispute settlement mechanism.  One European Commission 
trade negotiator observed after Doha that, “in the absence of any Declaration on public 
health, de facto non-compliance by several developing countries was a real risk.”88   
The uniquely binding venue and timing of Doha prevented the United States from 
substituting across governance structures.  The multiplicity of linked trade issues also 
benefited the developing country position.  Because so many issues were being 
negotiated for inclusion in the Doha development agenda at the same time – textiles, 
agricultural subsidies, investment, procurement, the environment, etc. – the developing 
countries were able to link issues to ensure concessions on TRIPS.  Because the U.S. was 
committed to securing an agreement at Doha to launch a new trade round, USTR officials 
decided early on that making concessions on IPR early on would increase the odds of 
success.89  As Haochen Sun observes, “[WTO] members came to understand that no 
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broad negotiating mandates such as investment and competition would emerge from the 
conference in the absence of a meaningful result on medicines.”90   
 
Institutional proliferation after the Doha Declaration 
 
If the story ended at Doha in November 2001, then it could be argued that 
viscosity in global governance represents an effective brake against the dynamics 
discussed here about the problems of institutional proliferation and fragmentation.  
However, the story does not end.   As the constraints faced by the great powers at Doha 
lessened, the regulation of IPR has shifted back towards the great powers’ preferred set of 
outcomes.  This has happened largely because of the proliferation of new institutional 
forms – namely, bilateral free trade agreements.91   
Prior to the Doha Declaration, developed countries had pushed for the inclusion 
of stronger IPR protections than TRIPS – referred colloquially as “TRIPS-plus” – in trade 
agreements outside of the WTO framework.92  After Doha, the developed countries – led 
by the United States – began pursuing this tactic with greater fervor.  The European 
Commission and the European Free Trade Area both inserted TRIPS-plus IPR provisions 
into their free trade agreements with developing countries.93  EU agreements with Tunisia 
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and Morocco, for example, included provisions requiring IPR protection and enforcement 
“in line with the highest international standards.”   
The United States was equally persistent in this practice.  Table 2 demonstrates 
the TRIPS-plus IPR provisions in U.S. trade agreements that have been negotiated since 
2000.  In all of these cases, TRIPS-plus provisions were inserted into the text of the 
agreement.  Beyond the use of FTAs, the U.S. has also used the carrot of bilateral 
investment treaties in order to secure bilateral intellectual property agreements that can 
include TRIPS-plus agreements.94 Over time, the viscosity of global governance on 
intellectual property rights has lessened.   
The TRIPS-plus provisions contained in FTAs would appear to conflict with the 
norms embedded within the Doha Declaration.  Indeed, most of these FTAs contained 
side-letters specifically mentioning that nothing in the FTA should infringe on the Doha 
Declaration.  For example, the side letter to CAFTA states that the treaty’s intellectual 
property provisions “do not affect a Party’s ability to take necessary measures to protect 
public health by promoting access to medicines for all, in particular concerning cases 
such as HIV/AIDS.”95  The Doha Declaration is also explicitly mentioned in the 
understanding.  Frederick Abbott argues, however, that these side agreements “are 
drafted in a substantially more restrictive way” than the Doha Declaration itself.96  At a 
minimum, the combination of legal texts introduces legal uncertainty, constraining the 
flexibility of the TRIPS accord desired by developing countries and global civil society.   
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As Table 2 demonstrates, the most prominent of the TRIPS-plus provisions is the 
protection of test data.97  To satisfy government regulations, drug manufacturers are 
required to undergo significant amounts of testing to demonstrate safety and 
effectiveness, imposing additional costs on first-mover manufacturers.  Data protection 
prevents other drug manufacturers from relying on that data to obtain approval for drugs 
that are chemically identical to the original patent-holder.  The United States ensures data 
protection for five years; EU member states offer between six to ten years.  In 2005, the 
USTR stated in its Special 301 Report to Congress that data protection would be “one of 
the key implementation priorities” for the executive branch.  The report went on to 
identify deficiencies in data protection for pharmaceuticals testing in more than twenty 
countries, including China, India, Russia, Mexico, and Thailand.98  In the past, even this 
implicit threat of economic coercion has been sufficient to force dependent allies into 
altering their regulations on these issues.99  By ensuring the protection of test data in 
these FTAs, developed countries have successfully extended the scope of patent 
protections.   
Both proponents and opponents of patent protection on pharmaceuticals agree that 
the ground has shifted since Doha.  Many of the same global civil society scholars and 
activists who claimed a victory at Doha acknowledge that the proliferation of “TRIPS-
plus” provisions in free trade agreements undercuts the public health norm established at 
Doha.100  Frederick Abbott, who under the auspices of the Quaker United Nations Office 
provided legal assistance to developing countries in TRIPS negotiations, concludes that 
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the developing world and NGOs have, “substantially increased their negotiating 
effectiveness in Geneva but have yet to come to grips with the U.S. forum-shifting 
strategy.”101  In a May 2004 letter to U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick, 
approximately 90 NGOs protested the inclusion of these TRIPS-plus provisions in FTAs, 
stating, “Intellectual property provisions in US free trade agreements already completed 
or currently being negotiated will severely delay and restrict generic competition…. 
through complex provisions related to market authorization and registration of 
medicines.”102  In a November 2006 report, Oxfam International declared that, “every 
FTA signed or currently under negotiation has disregarded the fundamental obligations of 
the Declaration by maintaining or imposing higher levels of intellectual property 
protection.”103   
It should be stressed that these developments represent only a second-best 
outcome for the developed countries.  Given their preference orderings, their ideal 
outcome would have been for the Doha Declaration to never have been signed in the first 
place.  Since Doha, however, the United States and European countries have successfully 
pursued a forum-shopping strategy to achieve their desired ends.  The proliferation of 
laws and institutions since the Doha Declaration has shifted the status quo closer to the 
U.S.-preferred outcome; one in which flexibility is only invoked in times of crisis 
epidemics.  At the same time, this proliferation has increased the degree of legal 
uncertainty developing countries must face when they contemplate this issue.  The final 
outcome does not precisely fit with great power preferences; however, a strategy of 
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institutional proliferation has allowed these states to get far more than would have been 
thought in 2001.   
 
The determinants of institutional viscosity 
 
The Doha Declaration and its aftermath offer three tentative lessons about the 
sources of viscosity in global governance structures.  The first is that the scope of an 
international governmental organization can provide a constraint against forum-shifting, 
provided that there is a tight linkage between the issue at hand and other issues under the 
organization’s purview.  The American and European positions on a public health 
exception to the TRIPS accord remained relatively stable and consistent while 
deliberations took place within the TRIPS Council.  It was only when developing 
countries made it clear that there would be no Doha round without concessions on this 
issue that there was a shift in the U.S. negotiating position.   
An interesting empirical question is the frequency of tightly linked bargaining 
issues within a single international governmental organization.  Even within the WTO, 
this sort of linkage only existed within the context of a bargaining round.  Between the 
end of the Uruguay round and the beginning of Doha, however, the WTO membership 
repeatedly thwarted efforts by some governments to add new issues to the WTO agendas.  
Beyond the drug patent issue, questions about labor standards and environmental 
protection were shunted to other IGOs at the Singapore and Seattle Ministerial 
Conferences.104  Despite these rejections, however, there was no effort to link these issues 
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to compliance with the WTO dispute settlement system.  Linkage took place only within 
the context of a bargaining round.    
The second lesson from the Doha Declaration is the way in which concerns about 
reputation led to increased viscosity.  For the United States in particular, there were 
concerns about the future of the WTO after the failed Ministerial in Seattle, as well as the 
need to display hegemonic leadership in the wake of the September 11th attacks.  By 
refraining from shifting fora away from the WTO, the United States reinforced the 
reputation of the WTO as the focal point for the trade regime complex.  This restraint 
also acted as a correction against the impression that the United States government would 
withdraw from international regimes that did not conform to its preferences.  
Given the Bush administration’s penchant for forum-shifting, “a la carte 
multilateralism,” and outright unilateralism, it is worth asking why the United States 
chose to bolster the WTO’s reputation at that particular moment.  One answer is that for 
the hegemonic power, any particular international organization within a regime complex 
only serves as a means to an end.105  The 2002 National Security Strategy explicitly 
stated:  “In all cases, international obligations are to be taken seriously.  They are not to 
be undertaken symbolically to rally support for an ideal without furthering its 
attainment.”106  This administration has been consistent on this point – when multilateral 
rules are broken, be they IMF lending agreements or UN Security Council resolutions, 
the U.S. will use the necessary means to enforce the norms underlying those multilateral 
institutions – including forum-shifting.  The United States has treated multilateral 
institutions that fail to enforce their own norms – like the UN – as less useful parts of a 
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regime complex.  Those institutions that are seen as effective – like the WTO – are given 
greater deference by the Bush administration.   
This implies that regime complexes will become more fluid and less viscous when 
components of the complex develop reputations for dysfunction.  A dysfunctional IGO 
generates policy outcomes that are either persistently at odds with great power interests 
or are so inchoate that they cannot be implemented or enforced.  In numerous issue areas 
the Bush administration has switched tracks from what it perceived to be a dysfunctional 
regime to a club regime inhabited by like-minded states.107  This has been an part of the 
administration’s strategy for some time.  The March 2006 National Security Strategy 
explicitly states, “The potential for great power consensus presents the United States with 
an extraordinary opportunity…. these relations must be supported by appropriate 
institutions, regional and global, to make cooperation more permanent, effective, and 
wide-reaching. Where existing institutions can be reformed to meet new challenges, we, 
along with our partners, must reform them. Where appropriate institutions do not exist, 
we, along with our partners, must create them.”108   
On nonproliferation, for example, the Bush administration has shown little 
interest in the recent review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty – because in the 
administration’s eyes, the NPT is a failed regime.  Instead, officials have shifted 
nonproliferation responsibilities away from the NPT/IAEA regime and towards the G-8, 
the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Proliferation Security Initiative.109  The PSI in 
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particular played a crucial supporting role in convincing Libya to renounce its nuclear 
aspirations.110  On global warming, the U.S. withdrew from the Kyoto protocol, objecting 
to the unfair distribution of costs and the lack of enforcement measures.111  In July 2005 
the United States launched the Asian Pacific Partnership for Clean Development and 
Climate with Australia, China, India, Japan, and South Korea.  Press reports intimated 
that its creators believed the arrangement to be an improvement over Kyoto.112  On trade 
matters, however, the administration has complied with WTO rulings against the United 
States – including, most prominently, the attempt to use the escape clause to raise steel 
tariffs in 2002.   
There is one final lesson to draw from the TRIPS case – even in the medium run, 
there is lots of fluidity and very little viscosity in global governance.  Despite the ability 
to link issues within the context of a WTO bargaining round, and despite the desire to 
bolster the WTO’s reputation, major trading states were perfectly willing to shift fora 
away from the TRIPS Council and towards bilateral preferential trade agreements as a 
way to strengthen IPR standards.  These moves did not obviate either the TRIPS accord 
or the Doha Declaration.  They did, however, demonstrate that the major powers were 
willing to work outside WTO strictures to alter the content of the IPR regime complex, 
despite risks to the WTO’s.  In the long run, it appears that an institutionally thick world 
bears more than a passing resemblance to the neorealist conception of anarchy.   
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July 2002.   
112 Quoted in Richard Lloyd Parry, “We Will Find A Cleaner Way, say World’s Big Polluters,” London 
Times, 29 July 2005.   
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TABLE 1 
GROWTH IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
Type of international regime 1981 1993 2003
International bodies 863 945 993
Subsidiaries or emanations of international bodies 590 1100 1467
Autonomous international conferences 34 91 133
Multilateral treaties 1419 1812 2323
TOTAL 2906 3948 4916
Source:  Union of International Organizations, data accessed at 
http://www.uia.org/statistics/organizations/ytb299.php.   
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TABLE 2 
IPR PROVISIONS IN AMERICAN FTAs, 2000-2006 
FTA Mandatory patent 
extensions 
Protection of 
test data 
Marketing 
restrictions 
Limits on parallel imports or 
compulsory licensing 
Jordan  X  X 
Singapore X X X X 
Chile X X X  
Australia  X X X 
Morocco X X X X 
CAFTA X X X  
Bahrain X X X  
Oman*  X   
Colombia* X X X  
Peru* X X X  
Thailand*  X  X 
*FTA negotiated but not ratified 
 
Sources: Committee on Government Reform minority staff, U.S. House of Representatives, Trade 
Agreements and Access to Medications Under the Bush Administration, Washington, DC, June 2005; 
Oxfam, Patents versus Patients:  Five Years after the Doha Declaration, Oxfam Briefing Paper #95, 
November 2006; Consumer Project on Technology, “Health Care, Regional Trade Agreements, and 
Intellectual Property,” accessed at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/trade/, 11 January 2007. 
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GAME STRUCTURE 
 
There is an issue X wherein all states must set their policies xi where for all countries i, 0 
< x < 1.  Each state’s utility is function of maximizing its own value for x while ensuring 
that the global production of x approaches its ideal point.  There is a pre-existing regime 
in which all states agree to set xi = x*.   
 
States can choose to set their value of x > x*, but there is a probability ρ of being caught, 
at which point there is a sanctions penalty of φ.   
 
The hegemon begins the game by first choosing whether to follow regime R, create a new 
regime R’ that sets xi = x**, or create regime R” that sets the penalty for noncompliance 
at φ’.  Let’s further assume that the mere act of going along with regime R in the first 
place bolsters its credibility.   
